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Political Economy Determinants of 
Non-agricultural Trade Policy
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Suryadipta Roy
The authors investigate several existing political economy hypotheses on trade policy using cross-
country trade-protection data for non-agricultural goods. The authors find that a left-leaning politi-
cal regime leads to pro-labor trade policies only for a subset of trade policy measures. In addition,
they find that income inequality and country-level corruption appear to be important determinants
of trade policy. For various measures of trade protection, it appears that corruption tends to hurt
labor interests by increasing trade protection in labor-abundant countries and reducing trade pro-
tection in capital-abundant countries. This finding suggests that corruption, among other factors,
may move trade policy away from the desires of the median voter. (JEL F10, F11, F13, D73)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April 2011, 93(2), pp. 89-104.
in both countries will be a laborer. Majority vot-
ing will favor trade liberalization (or free trade)
in labor-abundant countries but protectionism in
capital-abundant ones (where labor loses from
trade).The greater the income inequality in a
country, the more pronounced this effect is likely
to be. Therefore, one can expect inequality to
reduce trade protection in labor-abundant coun-
tries, while raising it in capital-abundant ones.
The motive for appeasing the majority may
be reinforced or neutralized by the political ide-
ology of the government. For example, an increase
in the leftist orientation of a government may lead
to an increase in the weight attached to labor
welfare relative to capital welfare in the govern-
ment’s weighted objective function. This will
result in trade policies that are more pro-labor
and complementary to the median-voter effect
discussed above.
Dutt and Mitra (2002, 2005) provide evidence
in support of both the inequality and political
ideology hypotheses, respectively. Using a frame-
work similar to the Heckscher-Ohlin Stolper-
T
rade policy is often used by policy-
makers to favor certain constituencies.
Tariffs and non-tariff barriers lead to
increases in the price of the goods
produced by import-competing sectors. Conse  -
quently, incomes of some factors of production
in these sectors often rise at the expense of other
factors. The theoretical foundations of this idea
come from the famous Stolper-Samuelson theo-
rem, which shows that protection raises the real
return of the factor used intensively by the import-
competing sector, while reducing the real return
of the factor used intensively by the export sector.
This result along with the Heckscher-Ohlin theo-
rem on trade patterns suggest that, for a given
country, greater protectionism causes hardships
for its abundant factor but benefits its scarce
factor. Thus, protectionism causes labor to lose
in labor-abundant countries but gain in capital-
abundant countries. 
Consequently, if capital ownership is concen-
trated in the hands of a few in both labor- and
capital-abundant countries, then the median voter
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the simultaneous interaction of inequality and
political ideology on trade policy. He finds that
an increase in income inequality in a pro-worker
regime is associated with more equitable trade
policies, while in a pro-capitalist regime it is
associated with more inequitable trade policies. 
Our paper adds to the existing literature in
the following ways. First, unlike the existing liter-
ature on cross-country trade policy, we use trade-
protection data for the non-agricultural sector
instead of aggregate trade data. We do this because,
while the non-agricultural sector (e.g., mining
and manufacturing) can be categorized as either
labor intensive or capital intensive, it is difficult
to ignore land as a third factor of production for
the agricultural sector. Therefore, given that a
prime motivation of this study is to understand
how trade policy affects income distribution
between labor and capital, using non-agricultural
trade-protection data is more appropriate than
using aggregate trade data. Second, in addition
to studying the inequality and political ideology
hypotheses, we incorporate a corruption hypoth-
esis as another determinant of trade policy. The
theoretical motivation behind incorporating cor-
ruption involves political influence: According
to interest group models of international trade
(Findlay and Wellisz, 1982; Hillman, 1982; and
Grossman and Helpman, 1994), organized special
interest groups lobby the government for trade
protection and also provide campaign contribu-
tions to influence policy. Recent work by Gawande,
Krishna, and Olarreaga (2009) suggests that the
weights that governments attach to these contri-
butions are positively correlated with levels of
corruption. That is, more-corrupt governments
attach higher weights to campaign contributions
(relative to social welfare) in their respective
objective functions. We build on this strand of
the literature by allowing the level of corruption
to interact with the capital-to-labor ratio. This
allows us to analyze how corruption is associated
with factor abundance in a Heckscher-Ohlin type
model. The existing literature on the effects of
corruption on trade openness and income distri-
bution is relatively sparse. In a recent contribu-
tion, Roy (2010) finds corruption to be anti-labor:
For the countries he studied, it reduces trade
openness (measured by the trade-to-GDP [gross
domestic product] ratio) in low-income countries
and increases openness in high-income countries. 
Our paper departs from Roy (2010) in two
major ways. First, we use data on the capital-to-
labor ratio instead of per capita income and can
therefore address trade policies in the context of
Heckscher-Ohlin type factor-abundance models.
Second, we use trade-protection data for non-
agricultural commodities instead of a broad
measure of trade openness as the dependent
variable in our regressions, for reasons discussed
above.
The paper is organized as follows: The next
section discusses the econometric model and the
data sources; the third section reports the results
for the baseline specification; the fourth section
discusses the robustness tests; and the final sec-
tion offers conclusions. 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Based on the discussions in the previous
section, we focus on these hypotheses:
The inequality hypothesis: All things equal,
an increase in inequality will reduce trade pro-
tection in labor-abundant countries and increase
trade protection in capital-abundant countries.
Following Dutt and Mitra (2002), we estimate
the following trade-protection equation for non-
agricultural goods using cross-country measures
on inequality and the capital-to-labor ratio:
(1)  
From equation (1), the marginal effect of the
INEQi variable on TRi is ʱ1 + ʱ2￿K/L￿i. Consider
a labor-abundant country. In this case, ￿K/L￿i is
small and the sign of the marginal effect of
inequal  ity is likely to be driven by the coefficient
ʱ1. Follow  ing the majority rule discussed above,
in this country protection is expected to fall when
inequality rises, giving the prior ʱ1 < 0. Now
consider a capital-abundant economy. In this
case, ￿K/L￿i is large and the sign of the marginal
effect of inequality will be driven by the coeffi-
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to rise with inequality, giving the prior ʱ2 > 0.
The ideology hypothesis: All things equal,
an increase in the leftist political ideology of the
government will reduce trade protection in labor-
abundant countries and raise trade protection in
capital-abundant countries. Dutt and Mitra (2005)
used a specification of the following form to test
the interaction between political ideology and
the capital-to-labor ratio: 
(2)  
where IDi denotes the political ideology of the
government. If IDi increases with left-wing ideol-
ogy, then according to the ideology hypothesis,
ʴ1 < 0 and ʴ2 > 0. In a related work, Dutt and
Mitra (2006) combine the inequality and ideol-
ogy hypotheses to test for the joint effect of the
majority rule and political ideology on trade pol-
icy. We add a third hypothesis. 
The corruption hypothesis: All things equal,
if corruption has an anti-labor and pro-capital
effect on trade policy, an increase in corruption
will increase trade protection in labor-abundant
countries and reduce trade protection in capital-
abundant countries. (Conversely, if corruption has
a pro-labor and anti-capital effect on trade policy,
an increase in corruption will reduce trade pro-
tection in labor-abundant countries and increase
trade protection in capital-abundant countries.) 
The following specification tests for the differ-
ential effects of corruption on trade protection in
labor-abundant and capital-abundant countries:
(3)  
where CORRi is a measure of the level of corrup-
tion in country i. 
If a higher level of corruption is associated
with greater influence for pro-capital lobby groups
(away from the median voter) in the design of
trade policy, then we should expect ʳ1 > 0 and 
ʳ2 < 0. Figure 1 presents scatter plots of countries
for two different protection measures—the Overall
Trade Restrictive Index (OTRI) (top panels) and
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the weighted average tariff (bottom panels)—
against an average measure of corruption (for the
years 1996, 1998, and 2000) obtained from the
World Governance Indicators. For the OTRI,
higher values of corruption seem to be associated
with greater trade protection in general, with
the effect of corruption being higher for capital-
abundant countries (i.e., countries with greater
than the median capital-to-labor ratio for the
sample). For the weighted average tariff, higher
values of corruption seem to increase tariff pro-
tection more in labor-abundant countries (i.e.,
countries with less than the median capital-to-
labor ratio for the sample) than capital-abundant
countries. Thus, the effect of corruption on trade
policy is an open-ended question, and the signs
for ʳ1 and ʳ2 can suggest whether it is beneficial
or harmful to the interests of labor—the median
voter.
We also address complementarity versus
substitutability of each of the individual hypothe-
ses. If inequality, ideology, and corruption are
correlated with each other, then the individual
models might be substitutes for one another.
However, it is possible that each individual
hypothesis conveys additional information, so
that a comprehensive model incorporating all
three might explain trade policy better. Thus, the
following comprehensive specification nests all
three hypotheses:
(4)  
Based on Bayesian and non-Bayesian criteria
and the goodness of fit measured by (adjusted)
R2, our results indicate that the comprehensive
model dominates each of the individual hypothe-
ses. Moreover, while we find substantial support
for the inequality and the corruption hypotheses
in the comprehensive model, we do not find sig-
nificant support for the ideology hypothesis in
predicting non-agricultural trade protection.
We use three separate measures of trade pro-
tection for non-agricultural commodities (obtained
from the newly constructed 2008 World Trade
Indicators from the World Bank) as dependent
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and (iii) the weighted average tariff. The OTRI is
a summary measure of the impact of each coun-
try’s trade policy on its aggregate imports. It is the
uniform tariff that, if imposed on imports in place
of the existing structure of protection, would
leave aggregate imports at their current level
(Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga, 2009).1 We use the
average value of the OTRI for 2006 and 2007, the
only years for which data are available. The sim-
ple average tariff rate is the average of all the
applied tariff rates on non-agricultural commodi-
ties that a country applies to its trading partners.
However, this includes tariff lines where there
are no trade flows. Thus, for comparison we
include another dependent variable—the trade-
weighted average tariff rate. Using these differ-
ent protection measures ensures that our results
are robust to alternative measures of trade pro-
tection. For both the simple and weighted tariffs,
we use the average during the period 2001-07. 
Data on asset inequality are adopted from
Easterly (2007). The measure for the asset-
inequality variable is the average adjusted Gini
coefficient during the period 1960-98.2 Data on
political ideology are from the Database of Politi  -
Bandyopadhyay and Roy
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Corruption and Trade Protection
1 Coughlin (2010) provides an excellent review of the different
World Bank trade restrictive indices. Given that non-tariff barriers
might provide more protection than tariffs, as in the case of certain
developed countries (e.g., the United States or the European Union),
it might be misleading to focus on tariffs only. Thus, in addition
to the tariff measures, we also use the OTRI measure as another
trade policy indicator in our regressions. 
2 Easterly (2007) contains an elaborate discussion on the construc-
tion and applicability of this inequality measure. cal Institutions (DPI) based on Beck et al. (2001),
which is a large cross-country database of politi-
cal institutions compiled by the Development
Research Group of the World Bank, covering 178
countries between 1975 and 2009. The ideologi-
cal orientation variable in the DPI is recoded as
follows to reflect the extent to which the relevant
government authority (presidential or parliamen-
tary) can be classified as leftist: Left wing = 3,
centrist = 2, and right wing = 1; hence, the higher
numbers signify more-leftist orientation. We use
the average of the variable between 1991 and 2000. 
Our baseline specification presents results
using the Nehru-Dhareshwar (Nehru and
Dhareshwar, 1993) capital-to-labor ratio data
adopted from Dutt and Mitra (2002) that use the
average value of the capital-to-labor ratio for the
1980s. The capital-to-labor ratio was calculated
by dividing Nehru-Dhareshwar capital stock data
(Nehru and Dhareshwar, 1993) by the labor supply.
The latter is defined as the population between
the ages 15 and 64, according to the World
Development Indicators. 
Subsequently, we performed robustness
checks using, respectively, the Summers-Heston
and the Easterly-Levine capital-per-worker data
for the 1980s (both adopted from Dutt and Mitra,
2002).3 The corruption measure was obtained
from the World Governance Indicators created
by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010), who
have constructed six broad aggregates that meas-
ure governance for over 200 countries starting in
1996. We use the “control of corruption” indicator,
which measures perceptions of corruption, and
take the average of the index for the years 1996,
1998, and 2000.4 (See the Data Appendix for
variables and sources.) The corruption index is
standardized to have zero mean and standard
deviation 1 in the sample, with higher values
representing better governance. For easy exposi-
tion, we multiply the index by –1, such that higher
values of the index denote greater corruption.
Thus, data for the explanatory variables are
lagged to those for the dependent variables. The
trade policy measures our paper seeks to explain
are from the 2001-07 period, while those of the
important explanatory variables (i.e., inequality,
political ideology, corruption, and the capital-to-
labor ratio) all predate the protection measures
in that the latest data for these variables are for
the year 2000. This rules out the possibility of
any feedback effect that the dependent variables




Table 1A presents summary statistics for the
major variables of interest. Hong Kong turns out
to be the most open country, with OTRI = 0.6
and zero values for the two tariff measures.
Singapore and Macao also have zero values for
the weighted and unweighted tariffs, respectively.6
In general, low-income countries seem to have
higher trade protection compared with high-
income countries. Thus, Tanzania, Djibouti, and
Bermuda have the highest levels for the OTRI,
simple average tariff, and weighted average tariff,
respectively. The inequality measure ranges from
a minimum of 23.97 for Mongolia to a maximum
Bandyopadhyay and Roy
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3 The Summers-Heston data are in constant 1985 international
dollars. The Easterly-Levine data are constructed from the Summers-
Heston disaggregated sectoral investment data along with disag-
gregated sector-level depreciation. The Nehru-Dhareshwar data
include the largest number of countries, followed by the Summers-
Heston data and the Easterly-Levine data. 
4 The control-of-corruption indicator is a measure of the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the
state by elites and private interests.
5 This was consciously done to circumvent the problem of finding
suitable instruments for all the explanatory variables. Obviously,
for the (suspected) endogenous variables we needed to have at
least four separate variables that (i) are individually highly corre-
lated with each of the explanatory variables and (ii) satisfy the
over-identifying restrictions (i.e., not correlated with the error term
in the various specifications). Satisfying both restrictions for four
separate explanatory variables would be a tall order. (See Murray,
2006, for a detailed discussion in this regard.) It is notoriously
difficult to find instrument(s) for corruption alone in equations
of trade protection or trade openness (see, e.g., Azfar, 2002) that
satisfy the overidentifying restrictions. On these grounds, we
decided to use lagged data for the explanatory variables that pre-
date the dependent variables, such that the explanatory variables
used in the study are not affected by feedback effects from trade
policy on income distribution or the production structure.
6 We addressed the issue of outliers in our data by running regres-
sions after dropping Hong Kong, Macao, and Singapore from the
pool of countries. Our major results involving the signs and the
significance of the coefficients remain unaffected. of 67.46 for Gabon. The corruption measure ranges
from a minimum of –2.28 for Finland to a maxi-
mum of 1.91 for Zaire. Other results for low-
income countries are similar to those for trade
protection: These countries have higher levels of
asset inequality (mainly in sub-Saharan Africa)
and higher levels of corruption. Table 1B reports
the correlation levels between the dependent
variables and the different explanatory variables.
All trade-protection measures are correlated with
higher asset inequality and greater corruption,
with the correlation coefficient varying from 0.45
to 0.49 for inequality and 0.69 to 0.80 for corrup-
tion. On the other hand, the ideology variable
seems to be weakly negatively correlated with
the protection measures. Corruption is highly
correlated with income inequality (r = 0.72) for
the minimum number of observations for which
all the variables are present in the sample (n = 34).
Thus, not including corruption as an explana-
tory variable would lead to an omitted variable
bias in estimating trade policy. 
Table 2A reports results for the inequality
hypothesis for non-agricultural goods using the
Bandyopadhyay and Roy
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Table 1A
Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
OTRI 95 10.80 10.22 0.6 54.9
Simple average tariff 174 9.01 6.31 0 32.53
Weighted average tariff 174 7.74 7.46 0 66.65
Inequality 130 42.23 9.10 23.97 67.46
Ideology 125 2.08 0.79 13
Corruption 184 0.02 0.99 –2.28 1.91
ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 75 9.47 1.95 5.67 15.99
ln(Easterly-Levine K/L) 58 9.29 1.35 5.45 11.73
ln(Summers-Heston K/L) 63 9.10 1.28 5.33 11.05
Table 1B
Correlation Matrix
Simple  Weighted 
average  average 
OTRI tariff tariff Inequality Ideology Corruption ln(ND K/L)
OTRI 1
Simple average tariff 0.82 1
Weighted average tariff 0.81 0.97 1
Inequality 0.45 0.49 0.45 1
Ideology –0.07 –0.04 –0.09 –0.11 1
Corruption 0.69 0.80 0.77 0.72 –0.09 1
ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) –0.69 –0.79 –0.72 –0.69 –0.04 –0.82 1
ln(Easterly-Levine K/L) –0.69 –0.79 –0.71 –0.68 –0.08 –0.78 0.89
ln(Summers-Heston K/L) –0.70 –0.80 –0.71 –0.67 –0.07 –0.79 0.90
NOTE: Number of observations = 34. ND, Nehru-Dhareshwar.equation (1) specification. For all measures of trade
protection, the inequality variable is negative
and significant and the interaction term between
inequality and the capital-to-labor ratio (measured
by the Nehru-Dhareshwar capital-to-labor ratio
data) is positive and significant (both at the 1 per-
cent level). Thus, greater inequality is associated
with reduced trade protection for non-agricultural
goods in labor-abundant countries and more trade
protection for such goods in capital-abundant
countries. Given that the median voter (or labor)
will gain from more trade in labor-abundant
Bandyopadhyay and Roy
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Table 2A
Inequality Hypothesis
Dependent variable:  Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: 
OTRI Simple average tariff Weighted average tariff
Inequality –2.59*** –1.17*** –0.73***
(0.87) (0.30) (0.26)
Inequality × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.31*** 0.14*** 0.091***
(0.10) (0.03) (0.02)
ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) –13.70*** –7.60*** –5.13***
(3.50) (1.27) (1.12)
Akaike information criteria (AIC) 438.40 414.70 386.30
Bayesian information criteria (BIC) 446.80 423.70 395.40
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.46 0.42
Ramsey RESET test p-value 0.01 0.40 0.61
Number of observations 60 71 71
NOTE: Robust or bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Low p-values of the Ramsey RESET test indicate misspecification; 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
Table 2B
Ideology Hypothesis
Dependent variable:  Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: 
OTRI Simple average tariff Weighted average tariff
Ideology –17.2 –10.2** –6.26*
(12.00) (4.96) (3.43)
Ideology × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 2.41* 1.35** 0.83**
(1.39) (0.56) (0.37)
ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) –6.42** –4.84*** –3.32***
(2.90) (1.29) (0.89)
AIC 376.70 352.80 327.40
BIC 384.40 361.10 335.70
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.38 0.35
Ramsey RESET test p-value 0.0002 0.001 0.01
Number of observations 50 59 59
NOTE: Robust or bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Low Ramsey RESET test p-values indicate misspecification; 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.countries and lose from more trade in capital-
abundant countries, majority interests may be an
important factor in driving non-agricultural trade
protection. Based on the results in Table 2B, non-
agricultural tariff protection also lends some
support to the ideology hypothesis. For both the
simple and weighted average tariffs, the ideology
variable is negative and significant, while the
interaction term between ideology and the capital-
to-labor ratio is positive and significant. Given
that the ideology measure captures pro-worker
interests, left-wing political ideology is associated
with pro-labor non-agricultural trade policies in
both labor-abundant and capital-abundant coun-
tries. These results provide support for the conclu-
sions of Dutt and Mitra (2002, 2005) regarding
non-agricultural commodities. However, based
on the results in Table 2C, we do not find any evi-
dence of a correlation between corruption and
trade protection because both corruption and the
interaction term (between corruption and the
capital-to-labor ratio) are generally not statisti-
cally significant.
Given our previous findings on the high degree
of correlation between corruption and trade pro-
tection and corruption and inequality, we sus-
pect misspecification problems based on results
from the stand-alone regressions. Thus, we esti-
mate a comprehensive model for trade protection
with inequality, ideology, and corruption along
with their interactions with the capital-to-labor
ratio as explanatory variables as in equation (4). 
The results are reported in Table 3. For trade
protection measured by the OTRI, however, none
of the explanatory variables turn out to be signifi-
cant. Except for inequality and its interaction with
the capital-to-labor ratio, all other explanatory
variables in this regression have signs opposite
to those anticipated. Moreover, as indicated by
the Ramsey RESET test, there seem to be mis-
specification problems in the comprehensive
model for the OTRI since the null hypothesis of
no omitted variables is rejected based on a signifi-
cant F-test. The inequality hypothesis is validated
by both the tariff measures. However, we do not
find any support for the ideology hypothesis. 
The corruption variable, however, is positive
and significant at the 10 percent level for the
simple tariff and at the 5 percent level for the
weighted tariff. The interaction term between
corruption and the capital-to-labor ratio is nega-
tive in both tariff regressions and statistically
significant for the weighted tariff. Thus, we find
some evidence that corruption is associated with
Bandyopadhyay and Roy
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Table 2C
Corruption Hypothesis
Dependent variable:  Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: 
OTRI Simple average tariff Weighted average tariff
Corruption –10.50 4.02 4.85†
(8.92) (3.40) (2.93)
Corruption × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 1.53* –0.01 –0.19
(0.87) (0.30) (0.26)
ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.85 –0.10 –0.20
(0.84) (0.39) (0.27)
AIC 448.00 436.50 404.30
BIC 456.50 445.70 413.60
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.50 0.47
Ramsey RESET test p-value 0.02 0.32 0.49
Number of observations 62 74 74
NOTE: Robust or bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Low Ramsey RESET test p-values indicate misspecification; 
† and * indicate significance at the 15 and 10 percent levels, respectively.greater protection in labor-abundant countries
and reduced protection in capital-abundant coun-
tries. The Ramsey RESET test does not report any
misspecification problem for the tariff regressions.
The comprehensive model explains a larger por-
tion of the variation for each dependent variable
in comparison with the stand-alone models in
equations (1) through (3), as indicated by the
higher values of the adjusted R2. Also, for all
dependent variables, both the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) select the comprehensive model
over the models of the individual hypotheses. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
First, we try to address the issue of omitted
variable bias by controlling for various country-
level characteristics that might be correlated with
the important explanatory variables in the regres-
sions. We use three control variables found to be
important determinants of trade policy in previ-
ous studies: an inverse index of democracy (the
Gastil index of political rights), a measure of
human capital, and the logarithm of per capita
income. The logic behind introducing these con-
trol variables is the following: The level of politi-
cal rights has been found to be an important
predictor of trade policy, because democratic
regimes may differ from dictatorial regimes in
terms of income distribution considerations
(Milner and Kubota, 2005). Literacy (or human
capital) measured by years of schooling may also
be an important determinant of trade protection
(openness) of countries. For example, educated
individuals may be better able to understand the
deadweight costs of trade protection that favors
special interest groups (Dutt and Mitra, 2002).
Finally, per capita income has often been used in
Bandyopadhyay and Roy
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Table 3
Comprehensive Model
Dependent variable:  Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: 
OTRI Simple average tariff Weighted average tariff
Inequality –0.03 –0.73** –0.63*
(1.36) (0.36) (0.34)
Inequality × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.01 0.07* 0.063*
(0.13) (0.04) (0.04)
Ideology 5.57 –1.01 –0.31
(10.70) (3.18) (2.37)
Ideology × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) –0.06 0.30 0.14
(0.99) (0.30) (0.22)
Corruption –1.60 7.98* 8.64**
(9.64) (4.08) (3.27)
Corruption × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.72 –0.48 –0.62*
(0.95) (0.40) (0.32)
ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.93 –4.41** –3.57**
(7.37) (1.94) (1.71)
AIC 360.20 325.60 306.50
BIC 375.50 342.20 323.10
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.63 0.57
Ramsey RESET test p-value 0.02 0.23 0.15 
Number of observations 50 59 59
NOTE: Robust or bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Low Ramsey RESET test p-values indicate misspecification; 
* and ** indicate significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively.the literature because low-income countries may
use trade policy (tariff barriers) to generate rev-
enue when the income tax base is small.
The political rights measure is an average 
of the score for political rights and civil rights
between 1991 and 2000 from Freedom House,
with higher values denoting less political free-
dom. The measure of human capital, adopted
from Neeman, Paserman, and Simhon (2008), is
an index of human capital based on a piecewise
linear function of total years of schooling for the
population age 25 and above, as obtained from
Barro and Lee (2000). Data on real per capita
income for countries are from the World Develop  -
ment Indicators. We also introduce several regional
dummies based on groupings from the World
Trade Indicators to capture geographical or struc-
tural characteristics otherwise not incorporated
in the regressions. 
Results for the comprehensive model with
the regional dummy variables7 included are
reported in column A of Tables 4 through 6. Both
the inequality and corruption hypotheses find
strong support from the two tariff measures: The
interaction term between the capital-to-labor ratio
and each hypothesis is significant at the 1 percent
level. None of the explanatory variables are sig-
nificant for the OTRI. Moreover, the ideology
hypothesis does not find support in any of the
regressions. The results remain unchanged once
we control for political rights, human capital,
and per capita income (see column B of Tables 4
through 6). None of the control variables are sig-
nificant. A striking feature of the model is that
for cross-country data it can explain a substantial
portion of variation for both tariff measures, as
characterized by the (adjusted) R2 values of 0.82
and 0.83 for the weighted and unweighted tariffs,
respectively.
We also carry out further robustness checks
by introducing additional controls that might be
correlated with trade protection as well as the
institutional structure of the economy. These
include the distance of the country from the equa-
tor, measured by its latitude; dummy variables
indicating the religious composition of the pop-
ulation; the legal origin; and the ethno-linguistic
fractionalization index, which has been found to
be an important determinant of corruption in pre-
vious studies (La Porta et al., 1999). Data on all
the variables are adopted from Neeman, Paserman,
and Simhon (2008). The results are reported in
column C of Tables 4 through 6. The inclusion of
these variables essentially has no impact on our
previous conclusions regarding the inequality
and corruption hypotheses. Inter  estingly, we find
support for the ideology hypothesis from the
unweighted tariff measure since both ideology
and its interaction with the capital-to-labor ratio
are significant (at the 5 percent level). More  over,
the values of the (adjusted) R2 for the tariff meas-
ures are higher. The results also indicate that the
comprehensive model does not receive much sup-
port from the OTRI protection measure in that
none of the explanatory variables (inequality,
political ideology, and corruption) turn out to be
significant. One explanation is that the OTRI is a
summary measure that incorporates both tariff and
non-tariff barriers, and because non-tariff barriers
are more prevalent in high-income (capital-
abundant) countries than low-income (labor-
abundant) countries, there might not be substantial
variability in the data for the model to significantly
explain variations in the OTRI. Moreover, the
OTRI measure is available for a much smaller
sample of countries (95) compared with that for
the tariff measures (174).
Finally, we use the Easterly-Levine and the
Summers-Heston capital-per-worker data as
explanatory variables instead of the Nehru-
Dhareshwar capital-per-worker data. Inter  estingly,
we find strong support for both the inequality
and the corruption hypotheses from the OTRI
trade policy measure (see columns D and E of
Table 6). For regressions with the tariff measures,
we also find support for these hypotheses when
we use the Summers-Heston capital-to-labor
ratio as an explanatory variable (see column E of
Tables 4 and 5). However, the corruption hypothe-
sis does not receive significant support from the
simple or weighted tariff regressions using the
Easterly-Levine capital-to-labor ratio because
both corruption and its interaction term do not
Bandyopadhyay and Roy
98 MARCH/APRIL 2011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
7 The regional groupings that were found to be significant on the
basis of a Wald test and, hence, the regressions include East Asia
and the Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, the Middle East,
and Latin America.Bandyopadhyay and Roy
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL 2011 99
Table 4
Simple Average Tariff 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Inequality –1.15*** –1.13*** –1.44*** –1.86** –1.58*
(0.30) (0.35) (0.40) (0.79) (0.78)
Inequality × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Ideology –3.36 –3.93† –4.74** 2.80 0.15
(2.38) (2.52) (2.24) (4.89) (4.21)
Ideology × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.35 0.40† 0.50**
(0.25) (0.26) (0.24)
Corruption 10.00*** 9.78*** 14.40*** 11.10† 15.70**
(2.59) (2.67) (3.41) (6.80) (6.86)
Corruption × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) –0.86*** –0.84*** –1.41***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.34)
ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) –5.98*** –5.81*** –7.87***
(1.54) (1.78) (2.11)
ln(Real GDP per capita) –0.86 –0.61 –0.53 1.06
(0.81) (0.92) (1.12) (1.02)
Political rights –0.13 –0.55 0.45 0.30
(0.56) (0.53) (1.16) (0.91)
Human capital 1.96 0.72 –2.93 2.63
(2.26) (3.02) (4.75) (4.03)
Inequality × ln(Easterly-Levine K/L) 0.17*
(0.09)
Ideology × ln(Easterly-Levine K/L) –0.37
(0.51)




Inequality × ln(Summers-Heston K/L) 0.16*
(0.09)
Ideology × ln(Summers-Heston K/L) 0.01
(0.45)




Regional groupings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude, religion dummies, legal  Yes Yes Yes
origin dummies, fractionalization index
AIC 282.20 286.60 283.80 214.50 239.70
BIC 309.20 319.80 329.50 252.50 279.50
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.80 0.77
Number of observations 59 59 59 45 49
NOTE: Robust or bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses; †, * , **, and *** indicate significance at the 15, 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.Bandyopadhyay and Roy
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Table 5
Weighted Average Tariff 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Inequality –1.01*** –1.20*** –1.26*** –1.00† –1.02*
(0.29) (0.30) (0.34) (0.65) (0.59)
Inequality × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Ideology –2.20 –2.84 –2.84 3.23 2.84
(1.99) (2.20) (2.09) (3.76) (3.56)
Ideology × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.20 0.25 0.26
(0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
Corruption 10.00*** 11.40*** 12.40*** 8.55† 12.00**
(2.20) (2.16) (2.68) (5.53) (5.48)
Corruption × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) –0.91*** –1.04*** –1.19***
(0.22) (0.21) (0.27)
ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) –5.26*** –6.18*** –6.63***
(1.51) (1.58) (1.88)
ln(Real GDP per capita) –0.22 0.13 –0.24 0.35
(0.74) (0.74) (0.83) (0.74)
Political rights –0.68† –0.85* –0.64 –0.84
(0.43) (0.45) (1.08) (0.75)
Human capital –1.53 –3.68* –7.27** –4.76*
(1.71) (1.97) (2.76) (2.68)
Inequality × ln(Easterly-Levine K/L) 0.091
(0.07)
Ideology × ln(Easterly-Levine K/L) –0.47
(0.41)




Inequality × ln(Summers-Heston K/L) 0.10†
(0.07)
Ideology × ln(Summers-Heston K/L) –0.39
(0.38)




Regional groupings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude, religion dummies, legal  Yes Yes Yes
origin dummies, fractionalization index
AIC 259.00 260.70 261.20 193.00 210.80
BIC 286.00 293.90 306.90 231.00 250.60
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.79
Number of observations 59 59 59 45 49
NOTE: Robust or bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses; †, * , **, and *** indicate significance at the 15, 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.Bandyopadhyay and Roy
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Table 6
OTRI
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Inequality –0.94 0.29 1.12 –4.64** –4.07***
(1.63) (2.18) (2.97) (2.01) (1.13)
Inequality × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.09 –0.04 –0.13
(0.16) (0.21) (0.30)
Ideology –2.10 –2.07 0.12 12.90 14.50
(9.66) (11.30) (14.90) (13.80) (13.70)
Ideology × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.24 0.23 0.10
(0.83) (0.99) (1.27)
Corruption 0.77 –6.63 –8.73 35.30*** 44.00***
(8.35) (11.60) (17.10) (10.20) (11.90)
Corruption × ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) 0.24 0.54 0.65
(0.85) (1.02) (1.72)
ln(Nehru-Dhareshwar K/L) –2.97 4.12 9.17
(8.65) (11.60) (16.80)
ln(Real GDP per capita) –3.94 –3.60 –0.95 0.49
(2.69) (2.92) (2.07) (1.72)
Political rights 1.11 2.08 1.87 0.63
(1.99) (2.69) (2.62) (1.98)
Human capital –10.40 –14.10 0.80 –1.01
(12.70) (14.90) (7.10) (6.34)
Inequality × ln(Easterly-Levine K/L) 0.46**
(0.21)
Ideology × ln(Easterly-Levine K/L) –1.32
(1.35)




Inequality × ln(Summers-Heston K/L) 0.43***
(0.13)
Ideology × ln(Summers-Heston K/L) –1.37
(1.39)




Regional groupings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude, religion dummies, legal  Yes Yes Yes
origin dummies, fractionalization index
AIC 353.80 349.90 358.40 197.90 223.50
BIC 378.70 380.50 400.50 231.20 259.00
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.59 0.54 0.62 0.59
Number of observations 50 50 50 36 40
NOTE: Robust or bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses; †, * , **, and *** indicate significance at the 15, 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.remain significant at the conventional level (see
column D of Tables 4 and 5). The difference in the
results probably can be attributed to the differ-
ences in the methodology and the assumptions
behind construction of the data on capital stock,
as these different cross-country datasets return
different country rankings on capital per worker.8
CONCLUSION
Using cross-country trade-protection data for
non-agricultural commodities, we find that in the
presence of inequality and left-wing ideology,
corruption is systematically related to higher
protection in labor-abundant countries and lower
protection in capital-abundant countries, thereby
hurting labor (i.e., the median voter) in both sit-
uations. Moreover, we find that in the presence
of inequality and corruption, political ideology
may not be a significant factor in explaining
trade protection for non-agricultural goods. The
hypothesis that left-leaning governments will be
pro-labor in their trade policy is supported only
in a small number of specifications. On the other
hand, the inequality hypothesis receives more
consistent support as a major determinant of non-
agricultural trade policy. These differences in our
findings relative to Dutt and Mitra (2002, 2005,
and 2006) are interesting, and our use of non-
agricultural trade-protection data seems to be
critical. The results also bring to light the inter-
actions among inequality, ideology, and corrup-
tion in determining trade policy. Future work in
this area should take the influence of lobbying
into consideration, in addition to invoking con-
cerns about the majority rule and the partisan
nature of government. 
Bandyopadhyay and Roy
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8 See Barseghyan and DiCecio (2010) for a discussion in this regard.
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